We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on executive Compensation. Using a data set from Chinese listed companies, we find out that executive compensation tends to be higher in companies with directors that have foreign experience. To evaluate this change in executive compensation, we further explore the impact of director with oversea background on payperformance link in these companies, which is an indicator of corporate governance and compensation management. Result shows that the impact of directors with foreign experience depends on the equity nature of the company.
Wade 1995) [6] .
Since a large portion of listed enterprises in China are SOEs, a noteworthy issue related to the board control of executive compensation is the effect of the control exercised by the state.
Government implements control over SOEs through appointment of chief directors and participation in CEO selection. In the past decades, SOEs paid excess salaries and offered considerable perks to the government representative. In order to limit the sky-high salary of appointed directors and ensure their independent position, the central government implemented director compensation reform in 2014, which place a ceiling of 8 times the average salaries of the enterprise on the overall compensation received by company heads appointed. And this practice is followed by many local reforms.
The involvement of low paid bureaucrats as state representatives can be expected to add downward pressure on CEO compensation. Moreover, previous work do further research on state-owned enterprises and find that they show weaker pay-performance link and factors that enhance the pay performance sensitivity in private companies do not work as well in SOEs. Takao and Cheryl (2006) found that government ownership of China's listed firms is weakening pay-performance link for top managers [7] .
These results do not suggest that SOEs are inferior or poor-managed. However, it is partly because they face multiple objective functions. Putting excess emphasis on firm's performance may hinder their fulfilling of other objectives such as improving social wellbeing and reducing unemployment.
Directors with Foreign Experience
The extent to which boards fulfill these duties is widely debated and may depend largely on the characteristics and skills of the directors (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010) [4] .
In this report we examine a specific board characteristic: foreign experience, which can be getting an education degree or working abroad. We did not place a limitation on the duration of study or work experience here. Board members with foreign experience could help to improve firm performance in emerging markets through at least three channels.
First, directors with foreign job or study experience have learnt how foreign organization works and facilitate the adoption of best practices, and they may improve firm performance if they bring different perspectives to the decision-Open Journal of Business and Management making processes of the company boards. Rodrigues's work (2014) shows that when the firm performance is measured by ROA, nationality diversity does significantly and positively affects it [8] . And the empirical study of Y Wang and D Liu shows that independent directors with foreign experience suppress "tunneling" behaviors of major shareholders and improve the level of corporate governance (2016) [9] .
Second, directors with foreign experience can provide professional advice and counsel to the management with regard to foreign business activities such as foreign acquisition or product expansion. Empirical studies of Giannetti, Mariassunta, Liao, and Xiao (2014) also show that the fraction of directors with foreign experience has a positive effect on foreign merger and acquisition and foreign sales activities [10] .
Finally, directors with foreign experience may have stronger incentives to pursue profitability and may be more independent in supervising management.
On the one hand, they have relatively weaker local ties and less motivation to please politicians or win local support. On the other hand, directors, especially independent directors with foreign experience have higher motivation to protect their social identity and reputation given the high economic cost and large amount of effort they have spent on acquiring foreign study or job experience (Wang, Wang, Hu, Cui 2015) [11] .
This paper examines whether attracting exceptionally talented individuals with foreign experience to the board has positive effects on the formulation of CEO compensation plan.
This paper discovered a positive relationship between the introduction of directors with foreign experience and the CEO compensation in listed firms. This result is consistent with previous work. The work of Giannetti, Mariassunta, Liao, and Xiao (2014) reviews that executive compensation appears to be higher in firms with directors with foreign experience and it contributes the change to the substitution of perks for cash, a more transparent form of compensation [10] . Firth, Fung, and Rui (2003) found that the presence of a foreign shareholder is associated with higher CEO pay possibly due to their desire to hire high quality managers [3] . Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, and Tan found a positive influence of foreign investors on CEO compensation. They contribute it to the proximity of the firm with global executive compensation standards given that the average CEO salary is extremely low in China [12] .
Previous empirical work on Chinese listed firm has been mostly focused on the impact of independent directors with foreign experience on executive compensation, and we contribute to this topic by including insiders in the analysis.
In this paper, we examine the overall effect of a board of directors with foreign experience.
We conduct this analysis in two perspectives. The first is the effect of directors with oversea background on executive compensation, and the second one examines the effect of it on firm's pay-performance link. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section introduces backgrounds and establishes hypothesis; Section 3 explains the methodology by developing the model and a series of variables; Section 4 explains sample selection and data collection; Section 5 and Section 6 are descriptive and regression analysis respectively, followed by conclusion in Section 7.
Backgrounds and Hypothesis
Given the result of previous empirical study and relevant theory, we hypothesize that the introduction of directors with foreign experience has a positive effect on executive compensation. For one thing, the average CEO salary in China is very low relative to US and many other countries, so it is very possible that directors with foreign experience are more generous in setting compensation plans. For another, directors with foreign experience may recognize the governance gaps between domestic and international enterprises and are more willing to offer high salaries which helps attract high quality CEOs-efficiency wage theory.
Moreover, some scholars contribute this effect to the transform of perks to cash payment-a more transparent way of compensation.
Hypothesis 1: the introduction of directors with foreign experience raises executive compensation.
Hypothesis 1a: Both the compensation in state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are positively affected.
As stated earlier in the paper, directors with foreign experience can help facilitate adoption of best practices, provide counsel to business activities and have more incentives to pursue profitability. The increased desire for more competent executives and increased transparency of compensation indicates improved corporate governance. Therefore, the improvement of executives' compensation can be viewed as the result of the improvement in corporate governance.
However, the improvement of pay level of executives is not always a good.
Since some of the board members (especially those major shareholders) also take management positions in the company, they may have the incentive to manipulate their salary as a CEO. Therefore, it is possible that higher executive compensation indicates excessive compensation, which might result from managerial power.
To evaluate the impact of directors with foreign experience on pay level, we further test the pay-performance link of the same set of companies. Agency theorists have traditionally considered compensation to be the most effective form of incentive to align the interests of top executives and shareholders. If compensation is sufficiently linked to the performance of the company's performance, then executives will be encouraged to improve performance in order to enjoy higher levels of executive compensation. On the contrary, low level of pay performance sensitivity, or pay without performance is the result of "managerial power" (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) , which indicates that CEOs have exerted significant influence over the board of directors who are expected to determine Open Journal of Business and Management executive pay independently [13] . Therefore, in this paper, we are going to test whether the introduction of directors with foreign experience enhance corporate governance by measuring the pay performance sensitivity using the same data set.
We believe that pay for performance methodology is an efficient approach to align the interests of executives and shareholders, and to ensure corporate performance. If the introduction of directors with foreign experience increases the independence of board of directors and helps structure a more efficient executive compensation scheme, the pay-performance link should be tightened; otherwise, if the introduction of directors with foreign experience is intended to justify a higher compensation scheme, it is very likely that the pay-performance link is weaker as a result of significant managerial power.
Here we expect a difference between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. Firstly, the pay-performance sensitivity of SOEs is always lower because they face many objectives other than profit-maximizing. And since the largest shareholder is absent in SOEs, insider control, if any, will further lower pay-performance sensitivity.
Hypothesis 2a: the introduction of directors with foreign experience increases the pay-performance sensitivity of the executive compensation in private enterprises.
Hypothesis 2b: the introduction of directors with foreign experience decreases the pay-performance sensitivity of the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises.
Model and Variable Description

Model Description
We establish two models for the two objectives described above, one for the executive compensation and the other for pay for performance sensitivities.
Model 1: The effect of directors with foreign experience on executive compensation:
The effect of directors with foreign experience on pay-performance sensitivity:
Variable Description
Executive compensation (LnCEOpay): Since executives in Chinese listed enterprises hold very little or no amount of stocks of their companies and it is difficult to distinguish whether the stocks they hold are self-purchased or rewarded, the compensation measure we chosen is total compensation of the top three executives, which is taken from the annual reports and does not include any stock incentives. To find out the impact of directors with foreign experience on pay R. Xiao Open Journal of Business and Management performance elasticity, I use log of CEO compensation as proxy for compensation and thus, zero pay cases are ruled out in this analysis.
Performance (LnPerformance): Two proxies for firm performance used as dependent variables are net income and operating profit since listed companies often use them as performance indicators in stock option incentive schemes (Fung, 2009) [14] . I used both type of measures in empirical analysis to check the robustness of the results to alternative measure of performance. To find out the impact of directors with foreign experience on pay performance elasticity, I
use log of net income and log of operating income as proxy for performance.
Therefore, companies that incurred a loss at a time are ruled out in the sample.
Foreign Experience (FE): Foreign experience (FE) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is at least one director with foreign experience in the board and zero otherwise. We do not distinguish foreign study or job experience here.
Control Variables: In this model, we control factors including corporate size, leverage, board characteristics, region, and industry:
Size (Lnsize): CEO pay is positively and significantly associated with compensation levels in most of the researches conducted around the world (Canyon, 1997) [15] . In this paper, we use log of operating income as a size indictors.
Leverage: Leverage is a control mechanism which affects management's flexibility in allocating resources. John and John (1993) [16] argue that pay policy can be used as a pre-commitment device to reduce the agency cost of debt. Therefore, we also control for this factor in our analysis. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total asset. Board Characteristics: We control three factors for board characteristics: ownership concentration degree (LShare), duality, and board independence (Indd). The diffuse ownership structure may diminish shareholder incentives to monitor managers and to limit managerial perquisite-consumption (Berle and Means, 1932) [17] . So the ownership concentration degree is expected to have negative relationship with CEO pay. We define ownership concentration degree as the portion of shares hold by the largest shareholder; Duality exists when a firm's CEO also serves as chairman of board of directors and it gives CEO wider managerial power. The measure of duality is a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if duality exists and zero otherwise; Board independence is measured by the percentage of board members who are outsiders. It is considered a mechanism to strengthen board control and thus, expected to be negatively related to executive compensation.
Region: Living expenses and average wage costs in coastal regions are much higher than the interior. CEO salaries are, therefore, likely to depend on the location of the business. To capture the differences in the economic development and the pay differences in different regions in China, we use two dummy variables:
West takes the value of 1 if the company is registered in the western China and Table 1 lists the variables and definitions used in our study. The table also shows the predicted effect of each variable on CEO compensation in our study.
Sample Selection and Data Collection
The sample and data are obtained from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database. We have excluded foreign enterprises in the database. In line with the other studies, we have also excluded companies in the financial sector. As a result, data were collected from 2480 companies listed on the stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen across five industry groups over a seven-year period from 2008 to 2014. [18] .
Descriptive Analysis
Although both average net income and operating profit dropped significantly in 2012 and 2014 possibly due to financial crisis, they had no influence on executive compensation, which continued to show an increasing trend. This might suggests changes in pay performance sensitivity.
Thanks to the introduction of policies to attract talented emigrants and in- For board characteristics, the ratio of independent directors is pretty stable with a slight increase for about 1% during the period. Ownership concentration is also very stable during the period. Duality shows a rapid increase from 2008 to 2011. This is largely due to the rapid increase of private listed companies in which chairman of the board is more likely to take the position as a CEO. In most SOEs, however, chairman of the board is appointed by the government and CEO is recruited from the talent market. Table 4 shows the correlation among variables. As sometimes reported in previous studies, executive compensation is positively and significantly related to firm size and performance. As shown in the table, the existence of directors with foreign experience is likely to have positive relationship with executive compensation. Table 5 shows the results of the regression with model 1. Columns 1 to 3 use net income as performance indicator and columns 4 to 6 use operating profit instead to check robustness. Columns 1 and 4 test the effect on the full sample, columns 2 and 4 present the result on merely SOEs, and columns 3 and 6 present result on merely private enterprises. Consistent with other research, executive compensation is positively and significantly related to the existence of directors with foreign experience, duality, firm size and performance. Ownership concentration and board independence have a negative impact on executive compensation as expected. And companies that locate in southern and western China are likely to offer lower compensation package. Note that although pay performance sensitivity in private enterprises are slightly higher in line up with other research, the difference is very small. This convergence can be contributed to a serious of SOEs reform carried out during the period. In the shareholding system reform, the highly centralized investment administration under the planned economy had been progressively transformed into a new pattern of diversification of investors and investment modalities. The goal of increasing vitality and competitiveness has been stressed over time, so it is not surprising to see an increase in executive pay performance sensitivity. Based on fine goodness of model fit, the influence of directors with foreign experience on executive compensation is positive and remarkable, which support hypothesis one. Results show that the CEOs whose board has foreign experience are paid about 12% more than CEOs whose board does not. Notably, the impact of directors with foreign experience on SOEs is significantly higher than that in private enterprises, with a 5% difference in coefficient.
Result
Test of Hypothesis 1
As stated above, some scholar attribute the rise in executive compensation to the gap between CEO pay at home and abroad, others believe that it may due to the transform of perks to cash payment. However, it is also possible that managing directors purposely recruit new directors with foreign experience to justify R. Xiao Open Journal of Business and Management the rise in compensation, or the new directors with foreign experience recruited has the desire to raise their compensation if they are the members of the management team. To evaluate the introduction of directors with foreign experience on salary management, we further study its impact on executive pay-performance link. We have center foreign experience and log of net income before multiplication (interaction) to avoid serious multicollinearity. As stated above, we substitute net income for operating income to test robustness of the result. Columns 1 to 3 use net income as performance indicator and columns 4 to 6 use operating profit instead to check robustness. Columns 1 and 4 test the effect on the full sample, columns 2 and 4 present the result on merely SOEs, and columns 3 and 6 present result on merely private enterprises.
Test of Hypothesis 2
The results on full sample show that the coefficient of the interaction is not significant. We should investigate the result on SOEs and private enterprises separately.
The result on private enterprises shows that the presence of directors with foreign experience increases the pay performance sensitivity by 0.03, which in- To test whether there may be possible collusion and higher managerial power to influence CEO compensation scheme after the introduction of directors with foreign experience, we want to study the effect of directors with foreign experience based on their relationship with the management team. If the those directors take management positions in the company, they may have higher incentive to manipulate CEO pay with their managerial power; in contrast, if they are members of the compensation committee, which is intended to be independent of the management and executive directors, the negative effect on pay performance sensitivity may be lower or disappear. Note that here we do not simply divide them into insiders and outsiders because the independent directors' position is to be questioned in China. Under the direct independent director pay system, the nomination of independent directors usually rests with the board R. Xiao Open Journal of Business and Management and the determination of their compensation rests with the enterprise rather than a third party. Therefore, the nomination and compensation setting process are black-box operation, which renders the independent position of "independent directors" questionable.
In the following test, we substitute variable FE into variables FE-SC and FE-Exe separately for further analysis. FE-SC is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if there is at least one director with foreign experience in the compensation committee; FE-Exe is also a dummy variable that take a value of 1 if there is at least one director with foreign experience in the management team. Table 7 displays the regression result after the substitution. Columns 1 to 3 display the result of SOEs and Columns 4 to 6 display the result of private enterprises as
comparison.
Result of SOEs shows the impact of executive directors with foreign experience on pay-performance is negative and those directors with foreign experience in compensation committee have no effect on pay-performance.
As expected, the role of directors in the company has great influence on CEO pay. In many enterprises, chairman of the board is the same person as CEO. We documented that duality exists in 26% of the companies in our sample. In this case, the board has larger incentive to increase their own salary and sacrifices the interest of other shareholders. For example, the sky-high salary of CEOs of Pin- 
Conclusion
Executive compensation is long under dispute for its extremely high price and opaque arrangement mechanism. In this paper, we examine the impact of a particular board characteristic-oversea background on executive compensation.
After an empirical study on a data set of Chinese listed company from 2008 to 2014, we found that CEOs whose board has foreign experience are paid about 12% more than CEOs whose board does not, which is possibly due to a convergence with international CEO pay, a more transparent compensation settlement Open Journal of Business and Management Result shows that the impact depends on the company's equity nature. In private firms, a board with foreign experience is more likely to raise the pay performance sensitivity of executives as a means to pursue greater firm performance and reduce agency costs. In state-owned enterprises, however, the introduction of directors with foreign experience seems to lower pay-performance linkgovernance condition was worse-off. After carrying out a test that takes the role of directors with foreign experience in the company into consideration, we ascribe the negative influence on pay-performance link to the CEOs' incentive to manipulate compensation scheme so as to avoid plenty of non-market factors that affect SOEs where the largest shareholder is absent.
Our analysis is subject to several limitations. In this paper, we do not examine the effect of foreign shareholders on executive compensation. Future study could separate these two effects. Moreover, future study can also examine the executive compensation stickiness or other indicators to evaluate the effect of directors with foreign experience on firm's compensation management. We consider these exciting areas for future research.
